60-52

MEMORANDIN FOR: Coneral G B Braking, USBC (ret.)

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

(Special Operations)

RESECT : Improvement of Internal Security in

Latin America

REFERENCE : Your menorandum for the Director, CLA,

dated 31 Becesber 1959, same subject.

- 1. Nour commute on my momerantum for members of the USIS were such appreciated and I consur that every scient should be node to improve the effectiveness of existing coordinating membershaps in furtherenes of our operations to improve internal security in Latin America. In this regard, when internal security assistance is involved, CIA would be most interested in being kept sivised of the development of Memal Security Septiment that are envisaged union the revised Marcal Security Program procedures you indicate are being worked out between the Departments of State and Defense
- In respect to CIA's recommendation to the Department of State that additional coordination arrangements be established in consection with our increased efforts to improve internal security in Latin America, it was not our idea that this would represent a duplication of existing mechanisms that was envisaged was an informal coordinating group, at the Assistant Secretary level, composed of individuals with operational responsibilities and outhority in their respective

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

departments or agencies. This group would neet informally, as required, to discuss developing internal security problems in the area, and to ensure maximum import of all program in this field in terms of U. S. policy objectives. I am glad to note that a Defense Department representative in now regularly meeting with Assistant Secretary Rabotton and the Chief of our Western Hemisphere Division with a view to improving coordination and effectiveness of U. S. programs in Latin America. I believe that Department of Defense participation in this regard will faifill a most useful function over and above existing machanisms.

ALIEN W. DULLES Director

ee: DDCI

Deputy Director
(Plans)

DDP/CI | mld (19 January 1960)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles

I have sent a copy of this memorandum to

After you have noted, I will show this to
General Cabell and send it on to DD/P

for comment.

5 Jan 60
(DATE)

FORM HO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 101 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

: Improvement of Internal Security in

Latin America

REFERENCES

: A. OSD (80) Memorandum to CIA dated 31 December 1959, same subject

B. CIA Memorandum for Members of USIB dated 22 October 1959, same subject

- 1. Paragraph 6 of this memorandum recommends your action in the form of a memorandum for the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) replying to reference A.
- 2. General Erskine's memorandum, which comments on reference B, makes the following principal points:
 - (a) Defense concurs in CIA's view that USIB should remain primarily responsible for coordination of the U.S. intelligence effort in support of Latin American programs.
 - (b) While the Department of Defense will be most happy to explore ways to coordinate joint efforts in improvement of internal security in Latin America, it considers that such improved coordination can best be achieved by utilizing existing mechanisms. General Erskine's office therefore does not believe that creation of a new coordinating group or committee would contribute toward the end of improved coordination.

- (c) Particular note is made of revised procedures currently being worked out between the Departments of Defense and State for handling Mutual Security Program matters. These procedures are stated to envision the development of jointly agreed Mutual Security Objectives Plans (MSOP's) for each country being assisted under the program. Guidance on internal security assistance will be included in the MSOP's, including programs of assistance to foreign military forces in the internal security field.
- 3. You will recall that paragraph 5 of reference B stated that CIA was contacting Assistant Secretary Rubottom's office at State to recommend the establishment of a working group to undertake overall coordination of programs designed to strengthen internal security in Latin American countries. In Agency discussions with State in this regard it had been emphasized that what was required was an informal inter-agency group at the Assistant Secretary level, composed of individuals with direct responsibilities for operations of their respective departments or agencies. It was felt that participation of Department of Defense representatives in such a group would most readily ensure overall coordination of State, CIA and Defense activities in terms of U. S. political objectives. Such an informal group has been established composed of Assistant Secretary Rubottom, Robert H. Knight, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs at Defense, and the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, DDP/CIA. The extent to which this informal coordination may be extended further to the working level is still under consideration at State.
- 4. General Erskine's memorandum has been discussed informally with the working level in his office and it has been determined that CIA's memorandum to members of the USIB was interpreted in Defense as proposing the establishment of another OCB-type working group. It was not clear to Defense that CIA was proposing to the State Department establishment of a higher level group that could deal more directly with operational matters. On the basis of informal discussions with General Erskine's

office, it is believed that Defense recognizes the advantages of establishing such a coordinating group on an informal basis at the level indicated.

- 5. In regard to the revised procedures currently being worked out between State and Defense for the Mutual Security Program, country MSOP's which contain guidance on operational planning on internal security are of direct interest to CIA. In practical terms, these documents will include statements of courses of action to improve internal security such as were formerly included in Overseas Internal Security Program documents. It is considered essential that CIA participate in formulation on the internal security sections of MSOP's that may be developed under these revised procedures.
- 6. It is therefore recommended that the following action be taken in regard to General Erskine's memorandum:
 - (a) The attached memorandum be forwarded to General Erskine over your signature to clarify CIA's thinking in regard to the coordinating group which was proposed by the Agency to the Department of State and its current status.
 - (b) That DDP/CIA be authorized to contact the office of the Coordinator of the Mutual Security Program in the Department of State for discussion of the revised procedures for handling the Mutual Security Program. CIA's interest will be emphasized in regard to MSOP's which contain guidance on internal security assistance with a view to inclusion of appropriate CIA representatives in discussions leading to formulation of these documents.

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James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

1 Attachment
cc: DDCI
The recommendations contained in paragraph 6 are approved:

CONCUR:
Deputy Director
(Plans)

Date

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pproved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIX-RDP80B016 76R000900050065-9

> OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEC 3 1 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT:

Improvement of Internal Security in Latin America

REFERENCE: Your memorandum for Members of USIB, subject as above,

dated 22 October 1959

Your memorandum focuses attention on several matters of immediate interest to this office. We share the concern which you express that our overall effort to counteract subversion in Latin America be as mutually supporting and well-coordinated as possible. This is essential in other parts of the world as well, especially the unstable areas of Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

With respect to the role of the various inter-agency coordinating mechanisms to which you refer, we feel that the following principles should generally apply:

- (a) The USIB is and should remain, in our view, primarily responsible for coordination of the U.S. intelligence effort. With specific reference to countering communist subversion, USIB and its component members should insure that the most accurate and up-to-date operational intelligence possible is available to the various departments and agencies responsible for conducting programs in this field.
- (b) The overall coordination of various departmental and agency programs designed to counter communist subversion is the responsibility of the Operations Coordinating Board. Within the OCB framework necessary coordination should continue to be accomplished through the variety of existing mechanisms presently organized on both a functional and geographic basis. Overall coordination of various programs in specific parts of the world should be the responsibility of the various country and regional working groups. Functional coordination on a world-wide basis should be accomplished through the various mechanisms in existence for this purpose. i. e. the "Task Force" on psychological matters, the "points of contact" established by the OCB Ad Hoc Working Group on Overseas Internal Security Program, etc. The latter groups should maintain contact and coordinate with the various geographic working groups as appropriate. To further complicate this process by creating still another coordinating body would seem both duplicative and unnecessary. However, we share your belief that greater coordination is possible. Therefore, it is suggested that ways be sought

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to utilize the various existing mechanisms referred to above in order to make them more useful and productive. This office is responsible for functional coordination at the Washington level on behalf of the Department of Defense on foreign counter subversion matters. We will be most happy to explore ways of making our joint efforts in this field as closely coordinated as possible.

In addition to better coordination, we feel strongly that a revitalization of some of our programs is also desirable especially in the field of internal security assistance to other nations under the Mutual Security Program. As you may know, revised procedures for handling MSP are currently being worked out between State and Defense. These procedures envision the development of jointly agreed Mutual Security Objectives Plans (MSOPs) for each country being assisted. Thus one document will serve as guidance for the appropriate courses of action under MSP in order to assure more integrated effort towards achievement of U. S. objectives in each country. Guidance on internal security assistance will be included in the MSOP. Within this general framework we hope to develop specific and meaningful programs of assistance to foreign military forces in the internal security field and develop a mechanism for implementing these programs in timely manner.

In summary, this office concurs in the need for a more effective program of anti-Communist effort in Latin America as well as other regions; however, we do not believe that the creation of a new group or committee would contribute toward this end. Please be assured that I am anxious to contribute in any way possible, using machinery now available toward elimination of Communist influence in Latin America.

C P EDSTING

General, USMC (Ret.)

Assistant to the

Secretary of Defense

(Special Operations)

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USIB-D-48.4/2 22 October 1959

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Members of the United States

Intelligence Board

SUBJECT

Improvement of Internal Security

in Latin America

- 1. The trend of events in Latin America gives cause for increasing concern with particular attention to the development of conditions which can be profitably exploited by the Communists. Therefore, it is essential that U.S. efforts to counteract the Communists be conducted on an across-the-board basis, be mutually supporting, and be well coordinated from planning to execution.
- 2. Current U.S. activities to counter Communist subversion in Latin America involve numerous elements within the Government. The over-all coordination of these activities at the "summit" stems from the NSC, but below that level is divided between the OCB and the USIB. There is, of course, continuing day-to-cay coordination between the departments and agencies involved, and some ad hoc working groups are in operation. However, in considering ways and means to achieve the highest degree of effectiveness in this effort, I believe that a more comprehensive coordination between all operational elements involved would be beneficial.
- 3. The primary role of the intelligence community with respect to the U.S. effort to counteract Communist subversion in Latin America is to collect the essential information required and produce the intelligence necessary to support this effort. In addition, there are resources under the control of various Board members that are now participating in the effort and can, in the future, play a more aggressive role. A case in point is the program being developed by the Army which General Willems described to us some

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
joint program involving full participation by all of the Military Departments. Specifically, the Army program envisages increa	sed 25X1
proposed consideration of the establishment of a Special Committee within the Inter-American Defense Board to provide for a more effective exchange of information concerning Communist subvers and related matters.	tee
4. We should examine all possibilities for improving the effectiveness of any resources we may have available for this effort.	_ 25X1
The primary objective of the USIB should be to seek way and means for ensuring the participation of every resource within the intelligence community that can be appropriately directed to the support of U.S. efforts to counter Communist subversion and relactivities in Latin America.	
5. Within the area of the OCB's cognizance, a wide range of activities are carried on in furtherance of the U.S. counterattack against the Communist effort in Latin America. These include	05.74
However, over-all co- time when we are trying for increased efforts all along the line. CIA is contacting Assistant Secretary Rubottom's office at the Department of State to recommend the establishment of a working	25X1

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6. With regard to those activities that are under the cognizance of the USIB and pertinent to the problem of countering Communist subversion in Latin America, I suggest that those members of our respective organizations who are responsible for the day-to-day running of the activities involved make every effort to ensure that the intelligence community will provide full support to the working group noted in paragraph 5 above. Careful coordination in this regard within your organization should result in making possible a U.S. effort of maximum effectiveness.



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